The University of Akron

IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review

Akron Law Journals

July 2015

Plan Sponsor Fiduciary Duty for the Selection of
Options in Participant-Directed Defined
Contribution Plans and the Choice Between Stable
Value and Money Market
Paul J. Donahue

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Law and Economics Commons, and the Secured Transactions Commons
Recommended Citation
Donahue, Paul J. (2006) "Plan Sponsor Fiduciary Duty for the Selection of Options in Participant-Directed
Defined Contribution Plans and the Choice Between Stable Value and Money Market," Akron Law Review: Vol. 39 :
Iss. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.

Donahue: Plan Sponsor Fiduciary Duty
DONAHUE1.DOC

3/20/2006 9:15:18 AM

PLAN SPONSOR FIDUCIARY DUTY FOR THE SELECTION
OF OPTIONS IN PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION PLANS AND THE CHOICE BETWEEN
STABLE VALUE AND MONEY MARKET
Paul J. Donahue*
I. INTRODUCTION
During 2002, employees and their employers contributed over $84
billion to defined contribution pension plans (DC Plans),1 bringing the
amount held in such plans on behalf of many of America’s working
people to nearly $2 trillion:2 a staggering amount that exceeded by over
$200 million the amount held in defined benefit pension plans (DB
Plans).3
*
Paul J. Donahue is a lawyer in New York City. He is a graduate of Dartmouth College, and he
received his Ph.D. and J.D. degrees from Yale University. He is a Fellow of the Society of
Actuaries, a Member of the American Academy of Actuaries, and holds the designation Chartered
Financial Analyst. He was formerly Senior Manager, Fixed Income Product Development, and
Counsel, Fixed Income, for INVESCO Institutional (N.A.), Inc, which is the nation’s leading
manager of stable-value investment vehicles.
1. A defined contribution pension plan is a pension plan funded by contributions of a
specified percentage of an employee’s compensation. BARBARA J. COLEMAN, PRIMER ON
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT 32-34 (BNA Books 4th ed. 1993). In many
instances, employees are the only persons making contributions to a given DC Plan. Id. In other,
rarer instances, an employer may be the only contributor to a given DC Plan. Id. In perhaps the
most typical model found in today’s workplace, an employer will agree to match a portion of an
employee’s contributions to the DC Plan. Id. For purposes of the nomenclature used throughout
this Article, the employer, group of employers, or union establishing and offering a pension plan to
its workers or members is called the “Plan Sponsor”; each employee who participates in such plan is
synonymously called a “Plan Participant.” Id.
2. More precisely, the total amounts held in defined benefit pension plans and DC Plans at
the end of the third quarter of 2002 were $1.56 trillion and $1.80 trillion, respectively. BUREAU OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS FOR EMPLOYEE PENSION AND INSURANCE
FUNDS BY INDUSTRY AND BY TYPE, NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT ACCOUNTS TABLE 6.11D
(April 2004), available at http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=208
&FirstYear= 2003&LastYear=2004&Freq=Year [hereinafter NIPA Table].
3. COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 32. A defined benefit pension plan is a pension plan under
which the Plan Sponsor promises to pay a specified monthly amount to each Plan Participant (and,
often, the Plan Participant’s surviving spouse or other beneficiary) for life. Id. This monthly
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While DC Plans and DB Plans share the goal of providing retirement
income to their Plan Participants, the way in which they seek to provide
that income differs significantly in one respect. Specifically, when a
Plan Participant in a DC Plan retires, the amount of income available to
him depends on the cumulative amount contributed to his account, plus
the investment return of that account.4 The Plan Sponsor has no
financial obligation to the Plan Participant beyond making any agreedupon employer contributions to the employee’s account.5 In other
words, the Plan Sponsor is not directly responsible for the investment
return in the Plan Participant’s account. By contrast, in a DB Plan, the
Plan Sponsor has the risk that the Plan’s investments do not perform
well. If the amounts that a Plan Sponsor has contributed to the DB Plan,
plus the investment return of the Plan, are insufficient to make the Plan
Sponsor’s agreed-upon payments to retired Plan Participants, then the
Plan Sponsor must contribute additional amounts to the Plan.6
Importantly, for both DB plans and DC Plans, the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) imposes on Plan Sponsors the legal
obligation to act in the best interests of the plan participants.7

payment is typically determined according to a formula that incorporates the Plan Participant’s
annual average salary and the number of years he has worked for his employer. Id.
4. Id. at 33.
5. Id.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (2000). The main purpose underlying the enactment of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1976, 29 U.S.C. §§1001-1461 (2000) (“ERISA”), was to require
an employer providing a DB Plan to periodically measure its investment return and to compel an
employer to contribute more money to its DB Plan if that investment return was not keeping pace
with the employer’s benefit promises. After setting out the commerce clause justifications for
Congressional action, the stated reasons for action listed in 29 U.S.C. §1001 (Congressional
findings and declaration of policy) deal exclusively with funding defects of DB Plans. For instance,
despite the enormous growth in such plans, many employees with long years of employment were
losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in such plans; owing to
the inadequacy of current minimum standards, the soundness and stability of plans with respect to
adequate funding to pay promised benefits were endangered; owing to the termination of plans
before requisite funds had accumulated, employees and their beneficiaries were deprived of
anticipated benefits; and that it was therefore desirable, in the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries, for the protection of the revenue of the United States, and to provide for the free flow
of commerce, that minimum standards be provided assuring the equitable character of such plans
and their financial soundness. See generally COLEMAN, supra note 1.
7. 29 U.S.C. §1104 (2000). A Plan Sponsor’s statutory obligation to act in the best
interests of Plan Participants is called the Plan Sponsor’s “fiduciary duty.” The ERISA conference
report states: “The [fiduciary duty] provisions apply rules and remedies similar to those under
traditional trust law to govern the conduct of fiduciaries.” Joint Explanatory Statement of the
Committee of Conference on the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, reprinted in ERISA
SELECTED LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1974-1986 33 (Anthony A. Harris ed., BNA 1988) (1986)
[hereinafter BNA].
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Although ERISA governs both DB Plans and DC Plans, until
relatively recently, the majority of assets held in private pension plans
were held in DB Plans.8 In addition, because the primary concern
underlying the enactment of ERISA was the existence of under-funded
DB Plans, it was only natural that DB Plans received more of the
Department of Labor’s attention when it came to the promulgation of
regulations.9 As noted above, however, in recent years the economic
important of DC Plans has grown significantly. At present, nearly 54%
of total private pension plan assets are held in DC Plans—and this
percentage is likely to increase, because while $80 billion was
contributed to DC Plans in 2002, only $39 billion was contributed to DB
Plans.10
Unfortunately, notwithstanding the explosive growth of DC Plans,
the Department of Labor has still not addressed much of its regulatory
authority to DC Plans. Recent events, however, are likely to change this
antipathy. In particular, the bankruptcies of Enron and WorldCom have
stimulated long-overdue and increased scrutiny regarding how well
Sponsors of DC Plans are meeting their fiduciary duties.11 These
bankruptcies had particularly disastrous effects on employees whose DC
Plan assets were heavily invested in the stock of their employers.12 The
very recently announced decision of IBM to freeze its DB Plan and place
more reliance on a 401(k) plan is likely to accelerate the move away
from DB Plans and elevate the importance of more intensive scrutiny of
Plan Sponsor compliance with fiduciary duty in managing DC Plans.13
One of the main duties of a DC Plan Sponsor is to choose the

8. As recently as 1985, the assets in DB Plans were double those of DC Plans. EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, EDUCATION AND RESEARCH FUND, PENSION INVESTMENT REPORT:
3RD QUARTER 2002 10 (Feb. 2003).
9. ERISA gives primary regulatory responsibility to the Department of Labor. Of the early
ERISA regulations, all pertaining to a single type of benefit plan apply to DB Plans. See, e.g., 29
C.F.R. §2530.203 (2005) (minimum vesting); 29 C.F.R. §2530.204 (benefit accrual). The focus of
other regulations clearly has funding of DC Plans in view, see 29 C.F.R. §2550. 407 (2005),
imposing limits on acquisition of employer securities and real property.
10. NIPA Table, supra note 2.
11. See Kris Frieswick, Prudent Man with a Plan, CFO MAGAZINE, June, 2002, at 75.
12. The losses of these individuals have drawn particular attention to the perils of employer
stock as an investment option within a DC Plan. See Unlearned Lessons in 401(k) Investing,
MSNBC.com, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/5190102/print/1/displaymode/1098 (last visited Nov. 15,
2005). The length of the bear market after the boom of the nineties has led plan participants to
make a more searching review of the options their employers offered them. See Kris Frieswick,
Honey, I Shrunk the 401(k), CFO MAGAZINE, Aug. 1, 2002, at 55.
13. See Mary Williams Walsh, I.B.M. to Freeze Pension Plans to Trim Costs, N.Y. TIMES,
January 6, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/06/business/06pension.html.
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vehicles in which Plan Participants can invest their money.14 ERISA
allows a Plan Sponsor to reduce the liability it would otherwise have for
selection of investment options if it allows its employees to choose
among options that meet certain tests.15 A Plan Sponsor must also give
its employees enough information about each of these options to allow
its employees to choose intelligently.16 Because these provisions are set
forth in Section 404(c) of ERISA,17 DC Plans that are designed to shift
the responsibility for selection of investment options to Plan Participants
are colloquially called “404(c) Plans.”18 Both Enron19 and WorldCom20
offered 404(c) Plans.
As might be expected, consultants have made employers well aware
that 404(c) Plans can reduce a Plan Sponsor’s liability for the investment
decisions of Plan Participants. However, consultants have not
necessarily been as successful at educating Plan Sponsors about the
liabilities that remain.21 Selection of a DC Plan’s investment options
remains a fiduciary function, and Plan Sponsors must choose those
investment options knowledgeably and thoughtfully.22 Even when the
options are chosen with due care, Plan Sponsors must assure a range of
choice and make adequate disclosure to participants in order to escape
liability for the choices Plan Participants make among those options.23
II. STRUCTURE OF THE ARTICLE
This Article is divided into two parts. In Part I, this Article
summarizes the scope of a Plan Sponsor’s fiduciary duty under ERISA
and explains why that fiduciary duty extends to the selection of
investment options for Participant-directed DC Plans (i.e., 404(c)

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

29 C.F.R. § 2550 (1992).
29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2000).
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(B).
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1.
Id.
Frances B. Smith, Your 401(k) Plan—Lessons from Enron, CONSUMER RESEARCH
MAGAZINE, Feb., 2002, available at http://www.consumeralert.org/pubs/research/CRFeb02.htm.
20. See Jane J. Kim and Kaja Whitehouse, Getting Personal: WorldCom Fall Renews
Pension Debate, DOW JONES NEWS SERVICE, July 10, 2002, at 1.
21. See W. Scott Simon, Fiduciary Focus: How to Bring Value to 401(k) Sponsors,
MORNINGSTAR.COM, May 6, 2004, http://advisor.morningstar.com/advisor/doc/print_article/
1,8911,3620,00.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000). This obligation is usually called the “prudent expert”
rule.
23. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3) (1992).
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Plans).24 In this context, the Article will then examine some of the safe
harbor provisions applicable to 404(c) Plans, including the requirement
that such Plans offer a low-risk-investment alternative and the
requirement that such Plans provide adequate disclosure to Plan
Participants about each investment alternative.
In Part II, this Article will apply the law explicated in Part I to a
particular investment-option selection decision made by all Sponsors of
404(c) Plans; namely: the decision to offer a money market fund versus
a stable value fund. In Part II, this Article argues that Plan Sponsors
who choose to offer a money market option instead of a stable value
option breach their fiduciary duty to Plan Participants.
A. Part I
1. General Definition of ERISA Fiduciary Duty.
Section 404 of ERISA addresses fiduciary duties.25 Specifically,
Section 404(a)(1) of ERISA provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to the plan solely
in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and—
for the exclusive purpose of:
providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
defraying reasonable expense of administering the plan;
with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of
like character and with like aims;
by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk
of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not
to do so; and
in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan
24. The Article will endorse recent suggestions that increasing knowledge about actual Plan
Participant investment behavior and psychology must figure in the investment options selected by a
Plan Sponsor. In other words, ERISA decisions must be based on actual, not ideal, Plan
Participants.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000).
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insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the
provisions of [ERISA].26

Courts have concluded that Congress intended this definition to
provide a great deal of protection to Plan Participants.27 In close cases,
Plan Participants always win, as evidenced in the following
representative opinion:
The sincerity of the trustees’ belief was not questioned in the hearing,
but it is essentially irrelevant to a determination of the prudence of
their conduct. While there is flexibility in the prudence standard, it is
not a refuge for fiduciaries who are not equipped to evaluate a complex
investment.
If fiduciaries commit a pension plan’s assets to
investments which they do not fully understand, they will nonetheless
be judged, as provided in the statute, according to the standards of
others “acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters.”28

For fiduciaries, ignorance of the economic characteristics of a
particular investment is no excuse, as fiduciaries are measured against
the standard of informed choice made by an expert.29
One element of the definition of fiduciary duty that may loom larger
in the future is the following phrase contained in Section 404(a)(1)(B):
“under the circumstances then prevailing;” an ERISA fiduciary must be
an informed fiduciary.30 As new information becomes available that “a
prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters
would use,” the ERISA fiduciary ignores such information at his peril. 31
As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated:
An independent appraisal is not a magic wand that fiduciaries may
simply wave over a transaction to ensure that their responsibilities are
fulfilled. It is a tool and, like all tools, is useful only if used
properly . . . . [Fiduciaries] are entitled to rely on the expertise of
others . . . . However, as the source of information upon which the
experts’ opinions are based, the fiduciaries are responsible for ensuring

26. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)-(D).
27. The conferees intended this outcome. The Conference Report accompanying ERISA
states: “The conferees expect that the courts will interpret this prudent man rule (and the other
fiduciary standards) bearing in mind the special nature and purpose of employee benefit plans.”
BNA, supra note 8, at 39.
28. Marshall v. Glass/Metal Ass’n & Glaziers & Glassworkers Pension Plan, 507 F. Supp.
378, 384 (D. Haw. 1980).
29. Id.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
31. Id.
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that that information is up-to-date..32

It would seem to go without saying that a prudent person acting with
skill and diligence and familiar with investments should be aware of the
statutory and regulatory requirements governing investment vehicles
which the ERISA fiduciary is considering. As we shall discuss below,
stable value depends on the ability to account for investment options at
contract value, a marked variation from the usual standard of fair value.
A paramount duty of ERISA fiduciaries dealing with Stable Value,
above all fiduciaries with the duty to value participant accounts for
purposes of transactions, is to assure themselves that participant
transactions qualify for contract valuation.
We shall discuss below how recent accounting and regulatory
developments heighten the significance of the “under the circumstances
then prevailing” standard.33
2. Selection of Investment Options as an Element of Fiduciary
Duty.
In the preamble to the Final Regulations governing Section 404(c) of
ERISA:
The Department [of Labor] emphasizes, however, that the act of
designating investment alternatives (including look-through investment
vehicles and investment managers) in an ERISA 404(c) plan is a
fiduciary function to which the limitation on liability provided by
section 404(c) is not applicable. All of the fiduciary provisions of
ERISA remain applicable, to both the initial designation of investment
alternatives and investment managers and the ongoing determination
that such alternatives and managers remain suitable and prudent
investment alternatives for the plan. Therefore the particular plan
fiduciaries responsible for performing these functions must do so in
accordance with ERISA.34

32. Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1474 (5th Cir. 1983).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000).
34. 29 C.F.R. § 2550 (1992). In her article, Susan Stabile does not quote this completely
unambiguous section of the preamble. Susan Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congress’
Misguided Decision to Leave 401(k) Plan Participants to Their Own Devices, 11 CORNELL J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 361, 377 (2002). She quotes instead a restatement in a footnote. Id. at 377 n.78 (quoting
57 Fed. Reg. 46,906, 46,924 n.27 (October 13, 1992)). Professor Stabile then interprets the logic of
In re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation, 74 F.3d 420 (3d Cir. 1996), despite applying to transactions
that predated the Final Regulations, as stripping this section of the regulations of any practical
effect, by suggesting that it precludes an award of damages due to the breach. Even if her
interpretation of In re Unisys were plausible, it seems unreasonable to suggest that subsequent
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The Department of Labor strongly reaffirms this position in its
amicus brief in the Enron litigation.
The scope of ERISA 404(c) relief is limited to losses or breaches
“which resulted from” the participant’s exercises of control. Section
404(c) plan fiduciaries are still obligated by ERISA’s fiduciary
responsibility provisions to prudently select the investment options
under the Plan and to monitor their ongoing performance. See
Advisory Opinion No. 98-04(A) (‘In connection with the publication
of the final rule regarding participant directed individual account plans,
the Department emphasized that the act of designating investment
alternatives in an ERISA section 404(c) plan is a fiduciary function to
which the limitation on liability provided by section 404(c) is not
applicable.’); Letter from the Pension and Welfare Benefits
Administration, U.S. Department of Labor to Douglas O. Kant, 1997
WL 1824017 at *2 (Nov. 26, 1997) (‘The responsible plan fiduciaries
are also subject to ERISA’s general fiduciary standards in initially
choosing or continuing to designate investment alternatives offer by a
publication of the regulation would not have altered the judicial context. This seems wrong. The
statement quoted states emphatically that selection of the universe of choices is not the result of
participant control, and therefore implies that a fiduciary cannot escape responsibility for provable
damages when a Plan Participant chooses an option that should not have been available to begin
with.
Professor Stabile’s reading of In re Unisys is seriously flawed. The Unisys Opinion
frames the issues thusly:
The plaintiffs, participants in individual account pension plans that Unisys Corporation
maintained for its employees, alleged, inter alia, that the defendants breached ERISA’s
fiduciary duties of prudence and diversification by investing plan assets in Executive Life
guaranteed investment contracts, as well as ERISA’s fiduciary duty of disclosure by providing
participants with misleading or incomplete communications regarding these investments and
Executive Life’s financial condition. In their defense, the defendants raised a question of first
impression, asserting that section 1104(c) of the Act, which relieves fiduciaries of liability for
losses which result from a plan participant’s exercise of control over individual account assets,
applies.

Id. at 425.
The Opinion later frames the issue of the extent to which damages might flow from control:
In our view, if the Plans did not offer an acceptable alternative to GIC investments, a
participant did not have the freedom and, in turn, the control to decide how his or her assets
were ultimately invested. In this regard, we find the evidence lacking. The record includes
documents which give a general description of the six funds the Plans offered; it does not,
however, include evidence sufficient to measure the breadth of actual plan investments or
assess all of the investment alternatives available to participants.

Id. at 446-47.
The Unisys decision actually supports the assertion that damages from the Plan Sponsor can be
obtained as a result of option selection decisions, rather than the reverse. Id. There is no tension
between the decision and the natural force of the preamble to the regulation. Perhaps Professor
Stabile’s desire to make a case for legislative reform has led her unconsciously to minimize the
protection provided by the existing legislative and regulatory regime. Stabile, supra, at 361.
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404(c) plan.’).35

A Plan Sponsor who has not exercised due diligence with respect to
the selection of investment options in its DC Plan has unambiguously
breached its fiduciary duty.36 No expert makes decisions without
considering various alternatives and comparing relative benefits.37
When due diligence is not exercised, then only the question of damages
remains to be settled. A Plan Sponsor would reduce litigation expenses
simply by stipulating the fact of breach in such a case.
It would be very difficult to prove that a Plan Sponsor’s review of
DC Plan investment alternatives met ERISA standards without written
documentation that included extensive quantitative analysis. Vague,
unquantified concerns, such as “I thought the X fund was safer,” would
have no probative value. An expert would identify all aspects of return
and risk and provide the greatest expected return for a given level of
risk.
In many cases, the contrast between a Plan Sponsor’s approach to
choosing managers for its DB Plan and the same Plan Sponsor’s
approach to choosing options for its DC Plan would likely be sufficient
to establish a breach of fiduciary duty.
3. The Fiduciary Duty Safe Harbor of Section 404(c) of ERISA.
Section 404(c)(1)(B) of ERISA provides as follows:
In the case of a pension plan which provides for individual accounts
and that permits a participant or beneficiary to exercise control over
the assets in his account [i.e., a DC Plan], if a participant or beneficiary
exercises control over the assets in his account (as determined under
regulations of the Secretary) – (B) no person who is otherwise a
fiduciary shall be liable . . . for any loss, or by reason of any breach,
which results from such participant’s or beneficiary’s exercise of
control.38

This statute establishes a “safe harbor,” which immunizes eligible
plan fiduciaries from liability for breaches of their fiduciary duty.39
While the statute itself is rather straightforward, the regulations set forth

35. Brief for U.S. Dep’t of Labor et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Tittle v.
Enron Corp. (S.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2002) (No. 01-3913).
36. See supra notes 30-33.
37. See supra notes 28-30.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(B) (2000).
39. Id.
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several additional requirements that must be satisfied in order for a plan
fiduciary to avoid liability for losses in a Plan Participant’s account.40
One of the requirements has the effect of obliging a DC Plan to offer an
“income-producing, low-risk, liquid fund”; another of the requirements
relates to adequate disclosure of investment options. Each of the
requirements is discussed immediately below.
4. The Requirement of an Income-Producing, Low-Risk, Liquid
Fund.
A 404(c) Plan must provide “a participant or beneficiary an
opportunity to choose, from a broad range of investment alternatives, the
manner in which some or all of the assets in his account are invested.”41
Department of Labor Regulations Section 404(c)-1(b)(3) stipulates the
minimum requirements for the range of investment alternatives;
specifically: (1) there must be at least three alternatives;42 and (2) the
alternatives must “in the aggregate enable the participant or beneficiary,
by choosing among them, to achieve a portfolio with the aggregate risk
and return characteristics at any point within the range normally
appropriate for the participant or beneficiary.”43
A 404(c) Plan must also provide “an opportunity for a participant or
beneficiary to exercise control over the assets in his individual
account.”44 Reasonable restrictions on transactions are not inconsistent
with participant control;45 however, at least three of the investment
alternatives must permit transactions at least once in a three-month
period.46 At least one of these three investment alternatives must accept
transfers as frequently as instructions can be given for any other
option,47 or each investment alternative which permits participants to
give instructions more than once in a three-month period must allow
transfers to “an income producing, low risk, liquid fund.”48 Plan

40. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (1992).
41. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(1)(ii).
42. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3)(i)(B).
43. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404(c)-1(b)(3)(i)(B)(3). The requirement of an income-producing,
low-risk, liquid fund is probably imposed by this regulation alone. For a Plan Participant nearing
retirement – and even more so for a Plan Participant in retirement – an income-producing, low-risk,
liquid investment alternative is normally appropriate.
44. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(1)(i).
45. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(ii)(C).
46. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(ii)(C)(1).
47. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(ii)(C)(2)(i).
48. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(ii)(C)(2)(ii).
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Sponsors have universally responded to these requirements by including
a “principal-protection” alternative among their DC Plan investment
alternatives.49 In order to meet this requirement, Plan Sponsors have
invariably chosen to offer either a Stable Value Fund, or a Money
Market Fund or both.50
5. The Disclosure Requirement of Section 404(c) of ERISA.
The regulations underlying Section 404(c) of ERISA require that “[t]he
participant or beneficiary is provided or has the opportunity to obtain
sufficient information to make informed decisions with regard to
investment alternatives available under the plan.”51 More specifically,
the regulations require:
A description of the investment alternatives available under the plan
and, with respect to each designated investment alternative, a general
description of the investment objectives and risk and return
characteristics of each such alternative, including information relating
to the type and diversification of assets comprising the portfolio of the
designated investment alternative.52

B. Part II
1. Introduction to Stable Value Funds and Wrap Contracts.

49. Although the statute and regulations do not strictly mandate a principal-protection
investment alternative, a Plan Sponsor would clearly have to include an option at least as
conservative as a high-quality, short-duration bond fund in order to have its DC Plan design fall
within the 404(c) Plan safe harbor. In practice, however, all Plan Sponsors of 404(c) Plans offer a
principal-protection investment alternative.
50. According to the 46th Annual Survey of Profit Sharing and 401(k) Plans (Profit Sharing
and 401(k) Council of America), for the plan year 2002, 52.1% of plans had Stable Value options,
54.6% had Money Market options, and 6.7% both. Every single plan had one or the other. In a
telephone conversation on June 25, 2004, David Wrap, President of the Profit Sharing and 401(k)
Plans Council, told the author that among larger plans, 70% had Stable Value; by overall assets,
16.9% of Plan Participant assets were invested in Stable Value and 4.7% were invested in Money
Market Funds. Telephone Interview with David Wrap, President, Profit Sharing and 401(k) Plans
Council, in New York City, NY (June 25, 2004).
51. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B).
52. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B)(1)(ii). With respect to an investment in a Plan
Sponsor’s stock, 29 C.F.R. §§ 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B)(1)(vii) and (viii): try to ensure that
employers cannot monitor the choice employees make with respect to employer stock and thereby
achieve a level of investment in employer stock by indirect pressures for which that they are
unwilling to take fiduciary responsibility; and require that employees receive a copy of the Plan
Sponsor’s most recent prospectus.
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In order to judge whether the Sponsor of a 404(c) Plan has acted as a
prudent expert in making the decision to offer (or not offer) Plan
Participants the ability to invest in a Money Market Fund, a Stable Value
Fund, or both, the reader must know something about the technical
aspects of a Stable Value Fund.53
Stable Value Funds are one of the more popular investment options
among DC Plan Participants.54 The cornerstone of a Stable Value Fund
is that it accounts for its investments at “contract value;” i.e., at cost,
plus accrued interest.55 In order to be eligible to be reported at contract
value, an investment must provide a guarantee that principal and
accrued interest will be available to meet Plan Participants’ demands for
benefits and transfers, each as permitted under their Plans. This
guarantee is provided by a “wrap contract” sold by large financial
intermediaries, such as banks or insurance companies.56

53. This introduction is intended to be as general and brief as possible while still giving a
reader who is new to Stable Value Funds all of the information that is necessary in order to make an
informed decision about the fiduciary conduct of Plan Sponsors in choosing among low-risk
investment options. For more information, see Paul J. Donahue, The Stable Value Wrap: Insurance
Contract or Derivative? Experience Rated or Not?, 37 RISKS AND REWARDS (Investment Section of
the Society of Actuaries, Shaumburg, IL), July 2001, at 18 [hereinafter Donahue, Stable Value
Wrap].
54. According to the Stable Value Investment Association, in 1998 Stable Value Funds held
16% of DC Plan assets ($182 billion). Donahue, Stable Value Wrap, supra note 54, at 25 n.2.
55. In other words, as with Money Market Funds, if a Plan Participant invests $1 in a Stable
Value Fund he will, barring economic Armageddon, receive back $1 plus accrued interest. (The
“stable” in Stable Value Fund refers to this preservation of principal; account balances do not vary
with changes in market interest rates, but only increase with credited interest. The rate at which
interest is credited will change frequently, perhaps as often as daily, but such changes will be very
small in magnitude.). See Paul J. Donahue, What AICPA SOP 94-4 Hath Wrought: The Demand
Characteristics, Accounting Foundation and Management of Stable Value Funds, 16:1 BENEFITS
QUARTERLY, First Quarter 2000, at 44, 46 [hereinafter Donahue, What AICPA SOP 94-4 Hath
Wrought].
56. AICPA Statement of Position 94-4, the Stable Value “constitution,” descriptively names
this guarantee “a principal and accrued interest risk transfer.” Industry practice describes this
guarantee as “benefit responsiveness,” which is provided by the “benefit-responsive wrap contract,”
or simply the “wrap.” (In the discussion that follows, we shall refer to the principal and accrued
interest risk transferred by these contracts as a “wrap”). Statement of Position 94-4, Reporting of
Investment Contracts Held by Health and Welfare Benefit Plans and Defined Contribution Pension
Plans (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, New York, NY, September 23, 1994) at
15. The staff of Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), arguably the most important nongovernmental financial regulator in the world, has finalized two Staff Positions, AAG Inv-1 and
SOP 94-4-1. See Reporting of Fully Benefit-Responsive Investment Contracts Held by Certain
Investment Companies Subject to the AICPA Investment Company Guide, posted December 29,
2005, http://www.fasb.org/fasb_staff_positions/fsp_aag_inv-1&sop_94-4-1.pdf (last visited Jan. 18,
2006) [hereinafter AAG Inv-1]. This position, despite the limited scope of the title, amends SOP
94-4, and thereby affects all Stable Value. The Financial Accounting Standards Board has modified
SOP 94-4 in ways that are generally favorable for Stable Value plan participants.
It is effective December 15, 2006, for all plan years ending on or after that date. We will
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In essence, a wrap assures that funds will always be available to pay
Plan benefits and make transfers at contract value—regardless of the
market value of the underlying assets in which Plan Participants’
accounts are invested.57 Sellers of wraps take the risk (for which they
are compensated) that Plan Participants will withdraw large amounts
from Stable Value Funds when the market value of the underlying assets
in the Stable Value Fund is less than their book value.58 In extreme
cases, such a withdrawal would force the wrap issuers to pay the Stable
Value Fund money to make up the difference.59 This is most likely to
happen when short-term interest rates, i.e., those offered on investments
held in Money Market Funds, are higher than mid-term interest rates,
i.e., those offered on investments held in Stable Value Funds.60 This risk
is usually called “the risk of disintermediation.”61 Some inversion of the
yield curve occurred at the end of 2005 for the first time in five years.62
During a period of disintermediation, wrap sellers could face
significant losses on wraps, if Plan Participants could readily transfer
assets from a Stable Value Fund to a higher-yielding Money Market
Fund.63 It is critical to recognize that modern Stable Value Fund
investors almost never have available the option to transfer funds
directly to a Money Market Fund. In order for a wrap to be a financially
sound product, wrap sellers nearly universally insist that the 404(c) Plan
not allow direct transfers from a Stable Value Fund into a Money Market
Fund.64 In the typical 404(c) Plan that contains both a Stable Value Fund
and a Money Market Fund, the Plan Participant must “wash” money

discuss the effect of the amendment of SOP 94-4 below. See also Donahue, Stable Value Wrap,
supra note 54; Donahue, What AICPA SOP 94-4 Hath Wrought, supra note 55, at 49.
57. Donahue, Stable Value Wrap, supra note 54, at 18.
58. Paul J. Donahue, Measuring Fair Value for Participation Units in Stable Value Pooled
Funds, 41 RISKS AND REWARDS (Investment Section of the Society of Actuaries, Shaumburg, IL),
Feb. 2003, at 29 [hereinafter Donahue, Stable Value Pooled Funds].
59. Donahue, Stable Value Wrap, supra note 54, at 22.
60. Id. at 23.
61. Donahue, Stable Value Pooled Funds, supra note 58, at 29.
62. See CNNMoney.com, Markets and Stocks, http://money.cnn.com/2005/12/28/
markets/stockswatch/?cnn=yes (last visited Jan. 18, 2006). The last significant period of
disintermediation occurred at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, when the yield curve became
severely inverted during a period of overall increases in interest rates. Donahue, Stable Value
Wrap, supra note 54, at 23. The author is one of those who believes that globalization of finance
has worked a shift in paradigm that makes extreme interest rate volatility of a major global markets
participant, like the United States, much less probable, if not actually impossible. Minor inversions
of the type that has just occurred do not pose that threat.
63. Donahue, Stable Value Wrap, supra note 54, at 23.
64. Id.
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withdrawn from his Stable Value Fund account in an equity investment
alternative for at least ninety days.65
Naturally, an investment fund must actually qualify to use the wrap
to value assets at contract value for the financial guarantee of the wrap
contract to be of any benefit. For an employer separate account Stable
Value Fund, compliance with the requirements of SOP 94-4 now
provides that right.66 Pooled Stable Value Funds are generally organized
as bank collective trusts.67 Bank collective investment trusts are
governed by regulations issued by the Office of the Controller of the
Currency (OCC) found at 12 C.F.R. § 9.18.68 The basic requirement for
valuation of collective investment funds is that they be valued at market
value.69 However, in a letter dated December 21, 1995, the OCC
permitted “CIFs consisting solely of defined contribution plan assets
invested only in fully benefit-responsive GICs/SICs and liquid, shortterm securities and money instruments to [value] GICs/SICs at contract
value.”70
The last sentence of the letter reiterates that the exemption applies
solely to funds consisting entirely of DC Plan assets: “The OCC will
continue to require CIFs consisting of any defined benefit assets and all
CIFS holding GICs/SICs that are not benefit-responsive to value those
contracts at fair value.”71
Since 1995, for a Stable Value pooled fund to accept defined benefit
assets and to account for the fund at contract value, has been, at best,
serious negligence. Recent discussions at the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) and at the Financial Accounting Standards Board

65. Id. This means that funds withdrawn from a Stable Value Fund have to remain in an
equity fund, subjecting them to the risk of market loss, before those funds can be reinvested in a
Money Market Fund. The atypical situation where direct transfers are permitted without an equity
wash will be the focus of our discussion of a Plan Sponsor’s fiduciary duty relating to its decision
whether to offer Plan Participants a Stable Value Fund, a Money Market Fund, or both. Id.
66. See supra note 56. In my view, the draft proposal would have raised questions about the
continued availability of contract value accounting for individual Plan Sponsor Stable Value
options, but the change of a single article, from “a relevant measurement attribute,” to “the relevant
measurement attribute” addressed that concern.
67. LMStrategies.com, Stable Value Market Glossary, http://www.lmstrategies.com/
glossary.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2006) (stating the definition of GIC (stable value) pool).
68. 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (2004).
69. 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (b)(4)(ii).
70. Letter from Susan F. Krause, Senior Deputy Comptroller for Bank Supervision Policy, to
Charles M. Horn (December 21, 1995) (on file with author). GICs and SICs are types of investment
contracts qualifying for Stable Value accounting under the rules of SOP 94-4.
71. Id.
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(FASB) on wrap valuation72 makes the inappropriateness of accounting
for a pooled fund with DB assets at contract value very clear. In the
future, willful defiance of the OCC regulations will be the only plausible
explanation for a pooled fund with defined benefit assets to account for
the fund at contract value.
One of the actions taken by FASB that will have the effect of
increasing fees for Stable Value pooled funds, while quite possibly
decreasing overall retirement security,73 is to allow pooled funds to
contain Defined Benefit assets in contravention of OCC regulations and
still to allow accounting at contract value. This is especially regrettable
given that FASB must be aware of the OCC regulations.74 FASB’s
action has the appearance of willingly condoning a violation of
regulatory accounting requirements.
The likelihood that FASB’s actions will induce many bank sponsors
to value their Stable Value pooled funds in violation of requirements
makes it vital that a Plan Sponsor obtain assurance from a Stable Value
pooled fund bank sponsor that the pooled fund has no DB Plan investors.
2. Stable Value Funds v. Money Market Funds as Low-Risk
Investments.
For investments with guaranteed protection of principal, an investor
must normally sacrifice yield in order to gain liquidity, or sacrifice
liquidity in order to increase yield.75 Obviously, an investor ought not
give up more yield than the required liquidity demands—but that is
precisely what Plan Sponsors who choose Money Market Funds instead

72. See infra Part II.B.
73. As we have discussed, a wrap provides a smoothing of transaction values in exchange
for a wrap premium. Given their generally long-term investment horizon, DB plans should not agree
to pay that premium, all other things equal. (Of course, in a particular circumstance, a lower
management fee might entirely offset the cost of the wrap, and make the investment prudent.).
Paying a premium for unneeded coverage reduces the funds available to pay the defined benefit.
74. The author personally raised this point in his comments on the FASB draft, available at
http://www.fasb.org/ocl/FSPAAGINVA/34863.pdf, and in an e-mail dated 12/10/2005 to FASB
staff and board members.
75. “Liquidity” is used in the sense intended in 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404(c)-1(b)(2)(ii)(C)(2)(ii):
immediate access to funds. For a principal-protected investment, this means the right to sell the
Plan Participant’s units of participation to the fund at a price equal to the Plan Participant’s
contributions, plus accumulated interest. In the increasingly typical DC Plan that permits daily
transactions, this means that the Plan Participant has the right to redeem his units on any day
without prior notice. In the language of financial options, the participant owns a “put,” a right to
sell for a price equal to his contributions plus accumulated interest—regardless of the value of the
assets owned by the fund.
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of Stable Value Funds have done.
All prudent financial enterprises must match their assets to their
liabilities. A principal-protected option in a 404(c) Plan is no different.
Money Market Funds can offer a stable net asset value because they
invest in very short financial instruments governed by very strict SEC
requirements.76 Stable Value Funds, on the other hand, can invest in
longer-term financial instruments and still offer a stable net asset value
because of their wraps. Given the normal term structure of interest rates,
longer-term financial instruments have a higher yield than shorter-term
financial instruments. As the following statistics make clear, Stable
Value Funds simply outperform Money Market Funds.77

76. SEC Investment Company Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2001).
77. The author knows of no quantitative analysis that attempts to show that Money Market
Funds are superior to Stable Value Funds for risk/return preference. I am grateful to Hueler
Analytics, and particularly to Kathleen Schillo and Kelly Hueler, for giving me access and granting
me permission to use Hueler Analytics’ copyrighted Stable Value Index data in the construction of
these charts. The money market data is from the Donahue Money Market All Taxable Funds Index.
I am grateful to my former INVESCO colleague Ruth Bottorff for her help in accessing the money
market data, and to my former INVESCO colleague Andy Apostol for his help in turning the data
into graphs that present so much valuable information.
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a. How Stable Value Achieves So Favorable a Result
In the retail, non-Pension Plan market, investors have no economic
penalty for withdrawing their assets from a Money Market Fund on any
day they choose. However, investors who invest in Money Market
Funds through their DC Plans are operating in a different environment.
Federal income tax laws are designed to impose significant impediments
to DC Plan Participants who, without these constraints, might apply
savings intended for retirement to current consumption. Thus, in order
for DC Plans to qualify for the tax-deferral provided under the Internal
Revenue Code, a DC Plan must impose significant restrictions on
employee withdrawals.78 Accordingly, employed Plan Participants
generally cannot withdraw money from the Plan, and terminated
employees who are not retired pay a stiff penalty if they withdraw Plan
assets before retirement age.
By the very design of the laws under which it operates, i.e., the
barriers to withdrawal imposed by the Plan and Federal income tax law,
a DC Plan is ideally tailored to take advantage of the higher yields
offered by a Stable Value Fund. A Plan Sponsor who has only a Money
Market Fund within its 404(c) Plan instead of a Stable Value Fund
clearly has not taken these special legal circumstances into account.
Stable Value Funds can prudently invest at much longer durations than
Rule 2A7 permits for Money Market Funds, and thereby can make a
much larger contribution to a Plan Participant’s retirement security than
is possible with a Money Market Fund.
3. The Effect of AAG Inv-1.
As noted above,79 FASB has amended SOP 94-4 and made
additional requirements for pooled funds. However, in a statement that
has the practical effect of leaving unchanged the foundational
accounting reality that contract valuation is available for Stable Value
investment contracts the amendment notes that “contract value is the
relevant measurement attribute for that portion of the net assets available

78. A DC Plan will not be a tax-favored “qualified plan” unless, among many other
requirements, benefits begin no earlier than the latest of: (1) normal retirement age under the plan or
age 65, whichever is earlier (26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(14)(A)) (2005); (2) a participant’s tenth
anniversary of participation (26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(14)(B)); or (3) termination of employment (26
U.S.C. § 401(a)(14)(C)). Employees who access plan assets after termination but before reaching
age 59 1/2 must, in most circumstances, pay a 10% excise tax in addition to their regular rate of
income tax. 26 U.S.C. § 72(t)(1) (2005).
79. See supra note 56.
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for benefits of a defined-contribution plan attributable to fully benefitresponsive contracts.”80
With the exception of the required disclosures, the proposed changes
are extremely favorable to Stable Value investors. Of paramount
importance, the requirement that pooled funds disclose the termination
provisions of their wraps will make the extent of true protection much
more evident.81
The required disclosures about benefit-responsive contracts
proposed by the draft will make selection against the Stable Value
option easier.82 We discuss the peril of this situation in a particular
context below.83
4. Offering Both a Stable Value and Money Market Fund.
When a Plan Sponsor offers both a Stable Value Fund and a Money
Market Fund, any loss a Plan Participant suffers as a result of choosing
the Money Market Fund over the Stable Value Fund seems at first
glance to be clearly the direct result of Participant direction. Even
though offering the Money Market Fund at all is likely a breach of Plan
Sponsor fiduciary duty, because the participant can choose Stable Value,
the Plan Sponsor is unlikely to be liable for losses the Participants incur.
This is different from the situation where a Stable Value Fund is not
offered at all.
However, while the Plan Sponsor may not be liable for losses
suffered by those investing in the Money Market Fund, there may now
be some Sponsor liability to participants in the Stable Value Fund!84 It
is the foundation of this article that option selection is a Plan Sponsor
fiduciary duty for which section 404(c) provides no relief against
damages.

80. Id.
81. See AAG Inv-1, supra note 56.
82. The plan’s statement of net assets available for benefits must list total assets, net assets at
fair value, and net assets available for benefits. AAG Inv-1, supra note 56, at 14. If the net assets
available for benefits are less than the fair value, an informed participant knows that, pari passu,
there is an immediate gain on withdrawal or transfer. This raises the risk of disintermediation
overall, and makes practically certain that some informed participants will benefit at the expense of
less-informed participants.
83. See infra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
84. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
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5. Poor Plan Design Can Limit Return in a Stable Value Fund.
We noted above that disintermediation is the principal risk faced by
wrap sellers.85 DC Plan design is the first line of defense against
disintermediation,86 and responsible DC Plan design is part of a Plan
Sponsor’s fiduciary duty.87 The most obvious DC Plan design that
avoids this risk is one that offers only a Stable Value Fund and no other
low-risk option.88
If a Plan Sponsor chooses to offer a second low-risk option, the
responsible Plan Sponsor must prohibit direct transfers from one lowrisk option to another, to protect unsophisticated investors in each option
against the risk of disintermediation.89 In the language of the Stable
Value Fund industry, low-risk options other than Stable Value are called
“competing funds.”90 Sound Plan design requires that if a Participant
transfers money from a low-risk option, the money must go to an equity
fund or a long-duration bond fund (the “equity wash”).91 This
requirement forces Participants to expose withdrawals from a low-risk
option fund to market risk and serves as a disincentive to such
withdrawals that are based purely on disintermediation.92
Where both a Money Market Fund and a Stable Value Fund are
available within a given 404(c) Plan, the equity wash protects against
disintermediation and allows the Stable Value Fund to achieve its full
return potential.93 Since wrap issuers will insist on some form of risk
protection, the absence of an equity wash translates into a lower return
for Stable Value Fund Participants.94
85. See Paul J. Donahue & Stephen F. LeLaurin, Stable Value, Money Market or Both?
Implications for Plan Sponsors and for the Stable Value Industry, with, 6:4 STABLE TIMES (Stable Value
Investment Association, Washington, D.C.), Fourth Quarter 2002, at 15 [hereinafter Donahue, Stable
Value or Money Market].
86. Id. at 10.
87. Id. at 11.
88. Id. at 10. In such case, Plan Participants would not be able to move their assets from the
Stable Value Fund to the higher-yielding Money Market Fund.
89. Id.
90. Mark Foley, Competing Funds: “Barbarians at the Gate” or “The Phantom Menace,”
8:1 STABLE TIMES (Stable Value Investment Association, Washington, D.C.), First Quarter 2004.
Stable Value Fund wrap contracts negotiated by the author typically defined fixed income funds
with a duration of less than three years as “competing funds.”
91. Donahue, Stable Value or Money Market, supra note 86, at 10.
92. Id. Principal protection is a key value to any investor who chooses Stable Value or
Money Market. The requirement that a participant put principal at risk to shift from a Stable Value
Fund to a Money Market Fund to capture a short-term gain is therefore a significant disincentive.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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6. Eliminating an Equity Wash: A Violation of Fiduciary Duty.
Where a 404(c) Plan has both a Stable Value Fund and a Money
Market Fund and the requirement of an equity wash, there is no doubt
that some Plan Participants regard the equity wash as an irritant.95 Those
Plan Participants are more likely to be financially sophisticated and able
to exert more pressure on Plan design.96 In effect, they are seeking the
right to disadvantage the less financially sophisticated Plan Participants,
as we shall illustrate below.97 Nothing could be a clearer violation of
Plan Sponsor fiduciary duty than for the Sponsor to give in to this
pressure.
Plan Sponsors who insist on a Plan design that has both a Stable
Value and a Money Market Fund—and that permits direct transfers
without an equity wash—have abandoned the best defense against the
disintermediation risk absorbed by wrap issuers.98 This abandonment
has significant consequences. Wrap issuers are not in the business of
transferring wealth from themselves to well-advised Plan Participants in
adverse investment environments. When Plan design does not provide
the protection that wrap issuers need, the investment strategy of the
underlying Stable Value Fund portfolio or the terms of the wrap contract
(or both) must provide the protection that the wrap issuers have lost.99
All wrap contracts have requirements for how the Stable Value Fund
is to be invested.100 This requirement is rational because what wrap
sellers are insuring is the difference between book and market values
within the Stable Value Fund, which the Fund’s investment strategies
can sharply influence. “Risky” plans might necessitate a shorter
duration fund (to minimize book to market differences). In the extreme,
the Plan that allows direct transfers to a Money Market Fund might need
to require that the Stable Value Fund have a duration close to that of the
Money Market Fund.101 This would minimize the issuer’s risk, but it
would also erode any return advantage to participants. Forcing shorter

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. The author personally negotiated hundreds of wrap contracts for the nation’s leading
Stable Value manager, and read hundreds of others negotiated by other managers.
101. Donahue, Stable Value or Money Market, supra note 85, at 10.
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durations could easily reduce the Stable Value Fund’s yield advantage
by 50%.102
Wrap issuers insist on more flexible termination provisions in their
wrap contracts where direct transfers are permitted. Understandably,
they want to be able to get out of the contract on reasonably short notice
when the potential for losses becomes high. The author has argued
elsewhere that the termination provision of a wrap contract is its most
important feature: “A contract the issuer can terminate at will after only
a short time is practically worthless to the plan that owns it.”103 A wrap
contract that can terminate just when Money Market Fund yields exceed
Stable Value Fund yields will lead to the total disappearance of principal
protection in the Stable Value Fund, turning the option into a short-term
bond fund with market losses.104 This would come as a rude surprise to
Plan Participants and could subject Plan Sponsors to an unforeseen
liability to make Plan Participants whole.105
Finally, in the presence of direct transfers to Money Market Funds,
even though wrap sellers might have significant investment restrictions
and the right to walk away, they also charge more for this abbreviated
coverage.106 Even after the increased protection of more restrictive
investment guidelines and more expansive exit provisions, the residual
risk is still greater and requires an increased risk charge. This further
reduces the yield advantage of the Stable Value Fund option by another
10%.107
In total, Plan Sponsors may sacrifice half or more of the total yield
advantage of Stable Value Funds over Money Market Funds when they
choose to permit direct transfers between such funds.108 The only
potential beneficiaries of this loss of yield are financially sophisticated,
market-timing Plan Participants who seek to benefit at the expense of
their less sophisticated co-Participants.109 In normal yield environments,
all Participants will suffer. Over the periods of time appropriate to
consider for a program of retirement savings, the differences in wealth
accumulation are meaningful, 36% or more over 15 years, based on the
results set out in the Accumulation graph in Section B(2) supra.
102. Id.
103. Donahue, What AICPA SOP 94-4 Hath Wrought, supra note 55, at 50.
104. Id.
105. The author bases this assertion on his judgment that sponsor disclosure about the Stable
Value option is not adequate to alert participants to this possibility.
106. The author was involved personally in price negotiations on such contracts.
107. Donahue, Stable Value or Money Market, supra note 86, at 10.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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In fact, a Plan Sponsor’s fiduciary problem is most severe precisely
when the right to transfer is advantageous. A Plan design option that
victimizes all Participants when it is not advantageous to transfer assets
benefits only those who move quickly when it is advantageous.110 And it
benefits those who move only at the expense of those who remain
behind.111 In essence, the Plan Sponsor has purchased—for a premium
assessed against all Participants—the right for a few to benefit at the
expense of the many.112 Though no doubt made unknowingly, this Plan
Sponsor decision is clearly not in the best interests of Plan Participants.
Courts should hold Plan Sponsors liable for losses suffered by
unsophisticated Plan Participants both as a result of the defective design
of the Plan and of “anti-selection” by the financially sophisticated few,
who are far more likely to be highly-compensated employees. Based on
the results set out in the graphs above, Plan Sponsor liability for a design
that sacrificed 25% of the yield advantage of the Stable Value Fund in
order to include a Money Market Fund, which would only be a snare for
the unwary and an opportunity for those trying to take advantage of
them, is likely to range from 5% to 10% of the value of the Stable Value
Fund.
7. Disclosure Required for Stable Value Funds Where Direct
Transfers to Money Market Funds are Allowed.
It is the author’s view that adequate disclosure to Plan Participants in
404(c) Plans that allow direct transfers between both Money Market and
Stable Value Funds must alert the Participants to the possibility of
profiting by moving from one fund to the other. This disclosure should
describe in general terms when it is likely to be in a Participant’s interest
to move from one fund to the other.
The basic untenability of offering both a Stable Value and Money
Market Fund without an equity wash emerges at this point. No wrap
issuer would sell a wrap to a Plan which provided the foregoing
disclosure—which we have just argued is necessary—because this
disclosure would intensify the risk of loss to the wrap issuer in an
adverse interest rate environment.

110. Id.
111. Donahue, Stable Value Wrap, supra note 54, at 21-22.
112. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text. The amount by which the Stable Value
return is lower, which we discussed above, see supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text, is the
“premium” the plan is paying for the right of financially well-informed participants to be able to
“put” their Stable Value investment to the fund in order to buy Money Market.
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8. Disclosure Implications of AAG Inv-1.
The disclosures required by AAG Inv-1 will make selection against
other participants easier.113 This raises the concern that Plan Sponsors
will have to attempt to educate all participants about this possibility,
potentially reducing the effectiveness of the option as a tool for longterm financial accumulation. However, the prudent response by a Plan
Sponsor will be to take no action to make additional information
available to participants where, in the exercise of prudence, it is not
generally in the interests of participants to do so.
III. CONCLUSION
Plan Sponsor choice of Plan options in Section 404(c) participantdirected plans is a fiduciary responsibility of the Plan Sponsor. Section
404(c) does not relieve Plan Sponsors of liability for failing to uphold
ERISA’s “prudent expert” fiduciary duty standard in choosing plan
options. Further, a Plan Sponsor must provide adequate disclosure of the
risks and returns of each option offered, as well as having selected the
option prudently, in order to shift the liability for their option selections
to Plan Participants.
Stable Value Fund or Money Market Fund is a universal example of
Plan Sponsor exercise of option selection, because of the requirement of
a liquid, low volatility fund. In the context of a DC Plan, Stable Value
has an absolute superiority to Money Market, as any reasonable due
diligence investigation would make clear. The choice of a Money
Market Fund instead of a Stable Value Fund meaningfully decreases
Participant wealth and is a clear violation of a Plan Sponsor’s duty to
select options as a prudent expert. Participants who were offered only
Money Market Funds have a right to recover the difference in lost
income from Plan Sponsors as damages due to a breach of fiduciary
duty.
Employer disclosure that does not identify the opportunity to profit
from direct transfers between Stable Value and Money Market Funds is
similarly inadequate. Participants who lost out because of the transfers
of others are in the absence of adequate disclosure entitled to recover
from the Plan Sponsor.

113. See supra note 61.
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